The Misshapen Monster
Benjamin GayedJeremy Bentham is credited with the description and inception of legal positivism in response to what he viewed as often arbitrary and unfair application of law within the English common law system. Positivism is an attempt to define the essence and nature of the law using only logic and empirically verifiable evidence in an attempt to establish a just system. What Jeremy Bentham certainly succeeded in doing was to describe and promulgate the advantages of statutory law over common law. However, neither he, nor John Austin, nor Hans Kelsen (his most prominent and immediate successors) were able to successfully divulge the nature or essence of law itself, because they rejected the premise of metaphysical reality (i.e. morality) with which the law is inextricably linked.
(There is some use to discussing law without morality, as law and morality do not overlap entirely. These men were able to work out different ways law may be passed to citizens from superiors, and to figure out the advantages or disadvantages to having judges able to legislate, or not, or to what degree, as well as the importance of a feedback system from the political inferiors to ensure equitability and sustainability.)
In his book, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart describes the difficulty in defining law by first describing the conditions which must be met to define anything. The precondition which he claims is the most important is the location of the item or concept we are attempting to define within a wider group with which we are familiar. In his own words, “…a wider family of things or genus, about the character of which we are clear, and within which the definition locates what it defines”.
Example: In the larger family of snakes, there are two snakes which have red, yellow and white stripes, though each type has a unique color sequence. There is a saying to remember which is which, “red on yellow kills a fellow (king snake), red on white might (coral snake)”. If I had only given you the rhyme without the larger family (snakes) in which to locate the red, yellow and white objects, you would not know whether I was discussing snakes, ice cream, balls or state flags.
To define the law, it has to fall within a larger family of similar things. Those who had studied the origin of law historically prior to Bentham (Aquinas being the foremost among them) seemed to generally agree that morality is a fundamental and guiding principle with respect to the formation and execution of what we now consider “the law”. When the Positivist philosophers refused to incorporate a metaphysical origin for the law, they also lost their ability to define it, because the law is not something entirely derived in the material realm. Because of this they were able to discuss what to do with laws once we had them, but not where they come from. Though these men made significant strides in bettering our understanding and practice of the law, Postivism as a complete theory of law has a glass ceiling, so to speak, which was formed by its refusal to incorporate old ideals (metaphysical reality/morality) into its analysis.
G.K. Chesterton discusses the phenomenon of ignoring old ideals in his book, What’s Wrong with the World. He talks about how there is no such thing as a new ideal, and that any revolution is really a return to some virtue, the importance of which had been lost. Chesterton emphasizes the necessity of considering what has been tried and applying history to our current endeavors, and that trying to move or ‘make progress’ without regard to the past is really a step in the wrong direction. In light of this, he describes man as properly being a “misshapen monster, with his feet turned forward and his face turned back.”
It is not only Positivist philosophy which benefits from this incorporation of “old ideals”. In fact it is the bane of modern times (I assume not only currently, but at all times) to assume that the ideals in vogue (equality, diversity…) are new, refreshing, and will carry us on to further enlightenment, while mocking the old ideals, considering them antiquated or useless (the concept of right/wrong and even of morality currently…) because evil is still present in the world. Perhaps we will find, as Chesterton suggested, that if we turn our heads around, our feet will finally find they are getting somewhere which is an improvement upon the current situation, instead of always expecting improvement to come around the next corner.

January 24th, 2009 at 12:43 pm
Here I am, the first to comment on my own essay, but I could not help myself. If you study the Biblical account of the Creation, you fill find that the Christian view of history starts when Adam was created in communion with God, and had productive work, perfect liberty, and an absence of shame or any kind of evil. Since the fall of Adam, the rest of the Biblical story, in continuity with history since the end of the Biblical account as well as current events are a story of the attempt of the restoration of Man (men and women) to this “garden” of purpose, fulfillment and liberty (found in God). This parallels what I was discussing above in regards to not losing sight of old ideals, and that any revolution is really a return to a good which had been ignored or forgotten. I do not think it a coincidence.
January 24th, 2009 at 6:42 pm
Ben, I think you’re getting at the principle embodied in William Penn’s famous quotation: “Those who will not be governed by God, will be ruled by tyrants.”
Bentham’s problem is that he artificially parses what law “is” from what it “ought” to be. He is never able to explain satisfactorily the his disregard for the latter question, and is therefore never able to justify satisfactorily the utilitarian foundations of his theory.
Bentham’s heir Nietzsche tells us, with his usual impeccable logic, that once the “ought” is discarded, the “is” becomes purely a function of who possesses power.
January 25th, 2009 at 10:22 am
Good essay, Benjamin, and timely as well.
C.S. Lewis called the attitude towards past views which you describe in your essay “chronological snobbery”: the belief that the ideas of your time are true because they exist, and that the ideas of the past must be false because they are past. Lewis always urged his readers to ascertain whether past ideas fell out of favor because they were disproved or (more often) because people stopped liking them. That advice is particularly necessary for we Western post-moderns today.
Also, Chesterton’s advice concerning positivist philosophy is equally necessary, given how thoroughly it has permeated modern Western thought. Our idea of “proof” means simply and solely “empirical scientific proof”. The thought that things can be proven which cannot be proven through empirical scientific means either doesn’t occur to most moderns or strikes them as absurd. This positivist definition of proof is very incredibly useful for a limited range of phenomena, of course, but it is either inappropriate or useless for the rest of life.
For example, take morality. As you noted, Benjamin, given that positivism limits itself to “is” at the expense of “ought”, it can’t say what morality is, nor what it ought to be. It can describe what kinds of behaviors tend to keep civilizations or societies together, but cannot supply any reasons to commit those actions, nor a definition of where the inherent motivations for them come from. Beyond this, however, it has virtually no standards for what kinds of behaviors should be preferred over others. (This is not to say that positivists don’t often talk about which behaviors people ought to prefer — they do — only that they’re usually not being consistent with or true to their positivism when they’re doing so.)
Dr. Peter Kreeft (author and professor of philosophy at Boston College) has an analogy at the limits of positivist philosophy. He talks about the difference between when he points at something to his children and when he points at something to his (rather unintelligent) dog. When he points at something to his children, his children understand the purpose of his finger’s outstretched position as an invitation to look past the finger and to the object to which it is pointing. And they find meaning when they look at those objects. His dog, on the other hand, only understands his finger’s outstretched position as an invitation to sniff his finger.
Positivism (and empirical scientific proof), Dr. Kreeft argues, is necessarily limited to the actions of his dog: it can look at the finger, but it can’t look beyond it. That’s not a knock on scientific proof, merely a statement about the inherent limits of its scope of inquiry. To look beyond the finger (that is, to find the real meaning of things) one must possess an ability to do more than simply “look at” things, which is the essence of positivism, and empirical scientific inquiry. It’s great at what it does, but not at what it doesn’t (or can’t) do.
The problem is that we moderns have largely forgotten that there even is anything beyond what scientific inquiry can explain. Our thinking has become so twisted and skewed that when we run up against the limits of positivist thought (that is, when we come to something we can’t prove through empirical scientific means), we consider that a strike against whatever we’re discussing (such as the existence of a supernatural reality or of metaphysical moral norms) rather than evidence of the limits of positivism. We need to remember that, as Hamlet told Horatio, “There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in your philosophies.” If the positivists are right, there are less things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophies, not more. That tenet is completely contrary to the entire witness of human history however: in every culture there have been literature, arts, and religion that pointed to the existence of more than the objectively observable universe. This is a fact that we need to remember.
January 30th, 2009 at 1:33 pm
Positivism is so rampant in the medical world, too. I like to joke around that when you see a paper nowadays, if there aren’t almost as many references as sentences, it’s not as respectable! Academic papers now have a number after every other sentence, so much so that they look a bit like scripture… (a source of authority other than raw observation)
Out of the three following things- the past, the present, and the future- the future is least like eternity. (Classical reasoning, or Aristotle’s ‘eternal law’ and derivable ‘natural law’, tells us that in order to ground a concept of law fairly and avoid totalitarianism, we ought to ground it as much as possible in the eternal.)
The past may be part-bad but it has at least a determinate character about it, which is an attribute also shared by eternity. There are no contingencies in eternity. The present, too, is like eternity according to St. Thomas, who taught that the present moment is a ‘nunc fluens’ or fleeting instant. Eternity, by comparison, is a ‘nunc stans’ or standing instant. Thus… past laws and traditions ought to be binding, insofar as we do not understand them and cannot think of any reason to abolish those laws. To find a fence-post in a field and to decide to tear it down just because we don’t know why it is there… is sheer lunacy. This is a basic defense of natural law and tradition. But since the instant most resembles eternity, we may think on our feet, so to speak, and think beyond the laws of the past, which are not perfect.
So… in trying to achieve a return to ‘past ideals’, we can avoid the accusation of atavism (equally as condemning as chronological snobbery) by rooting our conception of eternal law, in its connection with both the past, and the present moment. As for the future, don’t look straight at it! Look at eternity, and you get your legal progress as a side benefit. Look straight at the future, a Gorgon-and you turn to stone.