Whence Come Freedoms
Thomas LyonsA letter to the editor, in an edition of the Wisconsin State Journal last week…
Fred Thompson’s run threatens theocracy
“We still get our basic rights from God and not from government.”
Who said that, Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson? Neither. It was presidential candidate Fred Thompson in
Des Moines, Iowa, recently.
It’s frightening. Is America on the road to theocracy?
– Jeff Dean, Madison
Jeff Dean fromMadison’s argument goes like this.
1.) An acknowledgement that basic rights come from God is the thinking of a theocrat. (Assumed)2.) Presidential candidate Fred Thompson thinks this. (Given)
3.) Ergo, Fred Thompson is a theocrat. (1 & 2)
4.) Ergo, if Fred Thompson is elected president, America is one step closer to a theocracy. (3) Truth be told, the logical chain of those premises works. I don’t see any holes, any overdone logic leaps. If the premises are true, that’s a sound argument.
If you didn’t already know, though, the premises aren’t true. Jeff Dean from Madison’s argument falls apart at premise 1, which is totally, completely false.
Real quick, I’ll just go to the old Google, type “define: theocracy” and see what we come up with:
“Rule by religion. A government that is based on theistic beliefs. Iran is a theocracy.” That from reasoned.com.
Jeff Dean from Madison, if we use the transitive property, believes that an acknowledgement that basic rights come from God is a belief in rule by religion. I would argue, though, the following to counter Mr. Dean.
1.) That an acknowledgement of basic rights coming from God is important to ensuring these rights.
2.) That an acknowledgement of basic rights coming from God puts government in a more proper place.
God is nothing if not permanent. Governments, on the other hand, generally have a designed structural malleability that allows for their flexibility over time. Many things change with governments as the whim of authorities change: restrictions on power, interpretations of law, case history. In fact, even the recognition of basic freedoms by these governments toward their constituents can change over time.
Governments have, in the past, removed the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to many people in history. Did Jews of 1930s Germany, the Chinese students of Tiananmen Square, or union electrical workers under Soviet-occupied Poland have a birthright to these rights which were denied? Or is the case that because these oppressed peoples were born in societies wherein those rights were not recognized by their governments, that these people did not have any rights infringed upon?
To acknowledge that human rights is a birthright, and not a government-right, forces an acknowledgement by government that there is a higher power to which they must account. Perhaps government will claim nothing specific about this power (specific religious thought). But acknowledging that this birthright does, in fact, exist, forces a consistent ethic of respect for these freedoms.
It’s not the case that this acknowledgement yields a rule by religion. To say that it does gives us a false dichotomy: pure, raw, classic theocracy versus a society where freedoms are temporary. Birthrighted freedoms – endowed to us by our Creator – unite humanity, and ground us in an expectation of what is rightfully ours.
October 17th, 2007 at 8:35 am
I don’t know that I agree. Is freedom a moral good? I think so, and there are a lot of good arguments to support that position. But what you’re saying is a little different. You are saying that freedom is a moral right. I agree with you that freedom has to be either a moral right or a mere good secured by force–there isn’t really any middle ground. I also agree that any discussion of moral rights is incoherent without a theistic framework. But, taking the Bible as our standard of divine reference, there doesn’t appear to be any moral right to freedom. The Bible directs Israelites to take slaves when the conquer (Deuteronomy 20:14), to enslave thieves as punishment (Exodus 22:3), and discusses without condemnation enslaving debtors and their children (2 Kings 4:1-7).
1 Peter 2:18-19 says, “Slaves, submit yourselves to your masters with all respect, not only to those who are good and considerate, but also to those who are harsh. For it is commendable if a man bears up under the pain of unjust suffering because he is conscious of God.”
This passage presents a question of textual interpretation. Does the “unjust suffering” refer to suffering that is unjust because it is caused by slavery, or does it refer to suffering caused by a master that is harsher than he ought to be? The former interpretation might suggest a moral right to freedom by labeling slavery as an “unjust” state. Taking the permissive approach towards slavery in the rest of the Scriptures, however, the better interpretation is probably the latter.
Colossians 3:18-22 is also instructive:
“Wives, submit to your husbands, as is fitting in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives and do not be harsh with them. Children, obey your parents in everything, for this pleases the Lord. Fathers, do not embitter your children, or they will become discouraged. Slaves, obey your earthly masters in everything; and do it, not only when their eye is on you and to win their favor, but with sincerity of heart and reverence for the Lord. Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for men, since you know that you will receive an inheritance from the Lord as a reward. It is the Lord Christ you are serving. Anyone who does wrong will be repaid for his wrong, and there is no favoritism.”
The passage discusses the obligations of authority in pairs. The ruled is told his duty to the ruler, then, radically, the ruler is told his duty to the ruled, then, even more radically, both ruler and ruled are leveled in the eyes of the Lord and told their duty to Christ.
The only example not discussed in a pair with reciprocal duties are slaves. Wives are compared to Husbands. Children are compared to Fathers. Slaves are compared to no one. Masters are given no special duty to their slaves other than the general duties of Christian stewardship and rightful thought and action set forth later in the passage. The absence of a sentence on “masters” to follow that on slaves is suggestive. Wives have a moral right to expect certain duties from their husbands. Children have a moral right not to be embittered by their fathers. Slaves, however, appear to have no particular moral right against their masters, including, apparently any moral right to freedom.
I think the distinction between a right and a good is important. The only thing that keeps us from slavery are God’s grace and constant vigilance. Whether it’s the hard totalitarian state in China, or the soft totalitarian “nanny” state developing in the U.S., history suggests that all forms of government devolve eventually into a relationship akin to slavery. We who are sliding towards slavery have no moral right to anything else. If we want freedom, we have to take it, protect it, and nurture it.
October 18th, 2007 at 2:32 pm
I would argue that the natural law indicates a right to life. Therefore…
1.) Either other freedoms are somehow different enough from a right to life that they are mere goods and not freedoms with equal, natural law-level status,
or
2.) Other freedoms are endowed a la the right to life, and are moral rights and not goods.
I’ll redirect the burden to you, Jeremy. Here are your options:
1.) Argue for the former, that a right to life is different from other rights;
OR
2.) Argue that the right to life is not codified in natural law, or that natural law doesn’t exist, or that natural law isn’t relevant to our determination of endowed freedom;
OR
3.) Embrace my second option, and accept that freedom is a moral right.
October 18th, 2007 at 3:44 pm
I disagree with both your premise and your perception of options. Let’s start with your premise. First, I need to know more precisely what you mean by “right to life.” Do you mean a positive right to be kept alive if possible by others , or do you mean a negative right prohibiting others from killing you?
October 18th, 2007 at 6:31 pm
A negative right prohibiting others from killing.
October 18th, 2007 at 7:12 pm
I’m afraid I don’t see how a right not to be enslaved neccesarily follows from a right not to be killed. Elaborate?
October 19th, 2007 at 11:19 am
Looks like I could have used a dose of Occam’s razor…
I said: natural law indicates a right to life, and therefore human freedom.
I should have said: natural law indicates human freedom, including a right to life.
So now you have two options (as posted earlier):
1.) Argue that the human freedom is not codified in natural law, or that natural law doesn’t exist, or that natural law isn’t relevant to our determination of endowed freedom;
OR
2.) Embrace my second option, and accept that freedom is a moral right.
October 21st, 2007 at 8:31 pm
So Jeremy, are you saying that Jefferson erred when he called Liberty an inalienable right with which people are endowed by their Creator?
October 22nd, 2007 at 1:11 pm
Paul: I am saying that Jefferson declared liberty’s status as an inalienable right as a “self-evident truth.” Jefferson didn’t accept the moral supremacy of scripture. I do. My reading of scripture doesn’t preclude the possibility that freedom from enslavement is an inalienable right, but the proposition does not appear “self-evident” to me.
Tom: We’re operating from different moral authorities, and so comparing apples to oranges. I’m working from the text of scripture; you from natural law. Fortunately, our authorities are closely related. Would you mind working through the natural law argument that sets forth human freedom as a fundamental right? I know that the proposition exists in natural law, but I’ve never heard its derivation, and I think it’s probably important to our discussion.
October 23rd, 2007 at 12:15 pm
First, some precepts on natural law:
1) Man, through reason alone, can know that God exists, through His creation.
2) Man is made to live in community with others.
3) Man has an intellect and will, in other words, he is made to know the truth and to make his own decisions.
Second, the breakdown by Msgr. Jim Bartylla…
“Natural law, in participation with the eternal law of God, is based on the order of creation. This order is based on things being used according to the way they were designed. Since we were designed naturally with intellect and will, freedom is a necessary right.
However, all rights are based on obligations. Where does our right of freedom come from? Our primary obligation is to serve the God we can know through reason alone through a natural religion of service, reverence, and worship. Thus religious liberty (a primary freedom) is based on a duty to worship the creator. Our conscience is the closest arbiter we have of God’s will. Thus we have a duty to follow our conscience, and thus require the freedom to follow our conscience.”
Final, the close, by Thomas Aquinas…
“–Slavery is in opposition to natural law, since all rational creatures are entitled to justice.
–There is no natural basis for the enslavement of one person rather than another, thus removing any possible justification for slavery based on race or religion.
–Right reason, not coercion, is the moral basis for authority, for one man is not by nature ordained to another as an end. ”
Your turn.
October 23rd, 2007 at 9:40 pm
“Since we were designed naturally with intellect and will, freedom is a necessary right.”
This is the essence of your argument, and I agree with it. To the extent that scripture requires conformity of intention and action, humans have a natural moral right to exercise what liberty they need to conform.
The freedoms neccesary for a Christian to perform his duty to God are relatively narrow in scope, and are consistent with a general state of enslavement. That’s where I lose your argument. I don’t see any basis for extrapolating the moral right to the internal freedom neccesary to fulfill Christian duty to the broader concept of freedom from enslavement generally. By the terms of your own argument, it might be better for me to have the freedom to chose where I will live, what I will eat, and how I will labor, but I have no moral right to those particular freedoms. I can, in other words, be a slave in all respects without suffering violation of my moral right to “freedom,” so long as I have sufficient freedom to believe and practice my faith.
To bring this back to my original comment, the only freedoms in our Constitution that we can assert as a true natural right ordained by God is the First Amendment right to practice religion without state interference. The other freedoms we enjoy are unquestionably blessings and goods, but they are derived from the blood of the Constitutional Founders and the blood and determination of Americans who have come since then. Unlike the freedom to worship, which we can be denied by never really lose because of its divine origin, these freedoms we retain only by the might of our arm and the sweat of our brow.
That’s why almost all candidates on both sides of the aisle scare me this time around. If they agree on anything, it’s that the scope of my personal freedoms should be smaller.
October 23rd, 2007 at 10:35 pm
Sorry, I don’t buy it. Pure, classic enslavement infringes on the use of man’s intellect and will.
“The freedoms neccesary for a Christian to perform his duty to God are relatively narrow in scope, and are consistent with a general state of enslavement.”
1.) While I am a Christian, natural law speaks to all.
2.) One can’t have two masters, says Jesus. What of when a directive of God (the conscience) is in conflict with the directive of the slavemaster? You’ll say the only freedom the slave has is that which they fight for; I say the freedom is already endowed to them, and the master is in moral error to disallow it. It cannot be that enslavement and religious liberty aren’t mutually exclusive.
October 24th, 2007 at 8:49 am
We agree that people have a moral right to the scope of freedom necessary to obey God. A logical corollary is that people have a moral right to disobey any commands that infringe their ability to obey God. In the terms of your example, a master would be in moral error to order Baal worship, and a slave would have a moral right to disobey.
It does not follow, however, that the right to moral freedom requires a right to all freedoms. We have a moral right to obey God whether or not we are slaves, but I see no basis to say that we have a moral right not to be slaves in the first place.
October 25th, 2007 at 3:05 pm
I’m sorry guys. I’m not seeing the difference between a moral right and a moral good. Is the argument that a right cannot be taken away? (That doesn’t make any sense because there would be no point in arguing about it.) Is there a spectrum from “good” to “evil” and a moral right is something above neutral? So, Jeremy is arguing that slavery isn’t the best but isn’t evil?
It is hard to say whether something is morally good or morally bad because sometimes sin puts you in a position where every alternative is morally bad to a certain extent. Perhaps the slavery in the Bible is morally evil but could not be avoided because of sin. Sometimes you have to work toward the morally good position but it is a process that involves doing what you eventually want never to do again. For example, a drug addict might have to taper their drug use because quitting would kill them, or sometimes you have to kill someone to stop them from killing others.
October 25th, 2007 at 3:18 pm
I’d say that a moral right is a right that you are entitled to assert in all circumstances, whereas a moral good is something you may pursue, but only insofar as that pursuit does not conflict with your own moral duties or others’ moral rights.
October 26th, 2007 at 7:42 am
Hmmm … That’s interesting, Jeremy. Let’s try a thought experiment.
A powerful foreign clan — let’s call them the Goodells — attacks and conquers a weaker clan — let’s call them the Gayeds. The head of the clan — let’s call him Paul — takes the strongest among the Gayed clan for his slaves. Among them is a man by the name of Nabil. Nabil becomes Paul’s property by right of conquest and lives in Paul’s household. He has children, one of whom is named Jeremy. Jeremy refuses to meekly accept the servitude his father patiently endured, and he attempts to escape and kill Paul. Paul’s household guards capture Jeremy and, on Paul’s orders, put him to death.
Three questions:
1) Were Nabil’s involuntary servitude — and his lifelong acceptance of it — moral? He was captured in battle and claimed as property. Such was considered moral in the ancient world. What say you?
2) Was Jeremy in moral error when he attempted to escape and kill his rightful master?
3) Was his rightful master, Paul, in moral error when he had Jeremy executed for attempting escape and murder?
In answering these questions, please differentiate between the subjects’ moral rights and the moral goods they pursue.
October 31st, 2007 at 9:09 pm
Tom and I agreed to hold this discussion on the common ground shared by scripture and natural law. The problem with your example is that you incorporate a bunch of new moral authorities willy-nilly, like the standards of the “ancient world.” You’re introducing oranges into a discussion of apples. Nevertheless, I think we have an adequate foundation for a coherent answer to your questions.
1) The Goodells had no “moral right” to enslave the Gayeds, and, having enslaved them, they had no moral right to remain masters. This is the unstated premise that is the fount of your questions, and it is baseless. What ancient pagan society considered moral, to the extent not embodied in scripture, has no place in this discussion. Because the Goodells had no moral right to enslave, any decision by particular Gayeds to remain in slavery was neither moral nor immoral. The Goodells decision to attack and enslave the Gayeds was a political act that could be moral or immoral, but there is not information in this case to determine which it was. Regardless, any decision to remain in slavery was also a political act, and, assuming that the Goodells did not require the Gayeds to forgo their observance of Christianity, one without moral consequence.
2) There are two essential errors embedded in this question. First, as discussed above, Paul is Jeremy’s master as a matter of political fact, but not as a matter of moral right. Paul may be Jeremy’s master, but is not his “rightful” master. The consequence is that Paul’s “right” to mastery is coextensive only with his power to sustain it. Having conquered by the sword, and established his mastery on the basis of physical force, Paul’s “rights” to that mastery extend only as far as the reach of the blade on which that mastery is based. The second error embedded here is the way the question morally equates Jeremy escaping from Paul’s dominion with Jeremy killing Paul. Jeremy had no moral obligation to remain under Paul’s dominion, and his attempt to escape was neither moral nor immoral. Jeremy’s attempt to kill Paul, however, is loaded with moral consequence. Both Scripture and natural law make clear that homicide may be justified, but is always morally significant. The scenario presented here doesn’t provide enough facts to determine whether Jeremy’s attempt to kill Paul was justified. Even if the question is narrowed to whether Jeremy was morally justified in attempting to kill Paul merely because Paul had enslaved him, or because he wished to be free from Paul’s dominion, we don’t have enough facts to judge. If Paul’s rule directly infringed on Jeremy’s moral rights, such as his right to worship and practice Christianity, or to preserve the health and safety of himself and his family, killing Paul might be morally justified. If, however, Jeremy decided to kill Paul merely to faciliate his own escape, or in an attempt to turn the table and establish a mastery of his own, it becomes less likely that the attempt was morally justified.
3) The question imports the central error of the whole scenario that conquest made Paul Jeremy’s “rightful” master rather than just his master. Homicide is always morally consequential. The scenario is scant on facts relevant to determining whether Paul’s order of execution was moral. Paul had no moral right merely as de facto master to execute Jeremy. The question is whether Paul as a man was morally justified in killing Jeremy as a man–for example, in self-defense. It appears that although Paul was relatively impotent, his guards were able to thwart Jeremy’s attempt and subdue him. The immediate threat to Paul’s person presented by Jeremy had been neutralized. Paul therefore did not have the justification of self-defense for ordering his execution, and nor other moral justification is evident from the example.